Here is my Google Scholar profile.


  • Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos and Marshall Van Alstyne (2022). Digital Platforms and Antitrust. Chapter contribution to The Oxford Handbook of Institutions of International Economic Governance and Market Regulation. Editors: Eric Brousseau, Jean-Michel Glachant and Jérôme Sgard.


  • (2021). 'In Situ' Data Rights.



  • Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos and Marshall Van Alstyne (2021). Platforms Mergers and Antitrust. Industrial and Corporate Change. Special Issue on Regulating Platforms & Ecosystems edited by Michael G. Jacobides and Ioannis Lianos. Underlying data is available here.


  • Cabral, L., Haucap, J., Parker, G., Petropoulos, G., Valletti, T. and Van Alstyne, M. (2021). The EU Digital Markets Act. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021, ISBN 978-92-76-29788-8 (online), JRC122910.



  • Georgios Petropoulos (2018). The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Employment. Chapter contribution to the Rowman and Littlefield International edited volume "The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Opportunities and Threats Work and Welfare". Editors: Jacqueline O'Reilly, Max Neufeind and Florian Ranft.




  • Georgios Petropoulos (2017). An Economic Review of the Collaborative Economy. European Parliament Publication Series. Prepared for the European Parliament's Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee as an input for the 2017 workshop on the Collaborative Economy. Latest available version of the paper. Workshop details.



  • J. Scott Marcus, John Morales and Georgios Petropoulos (2017). Strengthening cross-border e-commerce in the European Union. Chapter contribution in the Bruegel Blueprint edited volume "Remaking Europe: The New Manufacturing as an Engine for Growth". Editor: Reinhilde Veugelers. Edited Volume.




Working Papers


Work in Progress

The Relationship between competition and innovation: How important are firms' financial constraints?

This paper studies the relationship between product market competition and innovation. It illustrates that apart from the well-studied impact of product market competition on the incentives of firms to innovate; it also affects their ability to have access to the necessary funds in order to innovate. I develop a step-by-step innovation model and show how product market competition may restrict the ability of firms to access external financing for their R&D investments. This effect can become the main driving force for innovation activities if firms are financial constrained. The relationship between competition and innovation depends on the intensity of financial constraints. For intermediate intensity the relationship is inverted-U shaped but the peak of the curve moves to lower levels of competition as financial constraints become more intense. If the intensity is high, then, the impact of competition to the ability of firms to finance their investments dominates and the relationship is monotonously negative. Moreover, the presence of financial constraints can increase investment in innovation in industries where firms have similar production technologies and the product market competition is low. Proposed market reforms that target to increase competition should be accompanied with other necessary policy initiatives such as appropriate credit reforms and well-targeted industrial policies that secure the access of firms to sufficient funds for their R&D investments.


Optimal algorithmic pricing for interruptible goods

I study selling mechanisms by a monopolist for imperfectly durable, interruptible and homogeneous goods. Having the infrastructure as a service public cloud computing market as a motivating example, I show that when the seller can commit over pricing strategies, she can exploit the time that buyers of different private valuations want to consume the good. Under certain conditions, by offering a randomized mechanism that incorporates the risk of interruption, the seller can improve her revenue in comparison to the standard deterministic mechanisms proposed by Myerson (1981) and Maskin and Riley (1989). Risk of interruption can lead to effective and profitable price discrimination. The mechanism can be implemented by simultaneously allocating the good through a posted price and an auction where buyers face the risk of interruption. Auctioning the goods can be designed so as to incorporate the risk for the winners of losing access to their service while it is still in operation. The posted price mechanism can by construction eliminate that risk.  Buyers of high valuations prefer to pay a risk premium and get the service through the posted price mechanism while buyers of low valuations unable to meet the price level of the risk premium enter the auction.